The army's liquor ration was generally exceeded by that of the navy, where a pint of wine or a half-pint of brandy or of rum (served as grog) was the standard daily allowance, with a gallon of beer serving instead on short voyages. As contemporaries recognized, however, naval officers had an easier time supervising the drinking habits of their men, for the sailors were confined aboard ship for long stretches.'4 By contrast, soldiers usually had access to liquor. Not only were they ashore, but they tended to be in or near towns, often for months at a time, and so had ample opportunity to learn where to obtain liquor most cheaply.
The ready availability of liquor naturally promoted drunkenness. Indeed, it is possible that most soldiers were habitual drunkards. wrote that Irish recruits often suffered from ulcerated legs, as a result of their heavy drinking, while English troops seldom had ulcers.17 Since soldiers' pay-eight pence per diem-was almost entirely consumed by stoppages, the men were often unable to pay for liquor out of pocket. Indeed, officers frequently argued that troops should be allowed almost no pocket money, lest they waste it on liquor. But a shortage of cash seems not to have had the desired effect, for the men were prone to barter their provisions or their accoutrements for spirits. Sometimes they stole in order to obtain the necessary money or items for barter. According to Bell, among the regiments stationed in Ireland, "The crimes most commonly committed by the men, were, pledging their necessaries for whisky, and stealing those of their comrades for the same purpose."'8 In the West Indies, where rum was plentiful, another medium of barter became popular: the liquor ration itself. The old rum, which the army usually distributed in preference to new rum-thinking it mellower and less harmful-was often traded in by the men, both because it was unpopular with them, being less potent, and because local merchants were willing to provide in exchange several times the quantity in new rum.'9
Living conditions heightened availability. Typically, the soldier was not to be found in the field, but rather in the more stable environment of garrison or fort, and while there he seldom stayed in barracks. Garrisoned troops were frequently billeted, and in frontier forts and fixed encampments soldiers were sometimes allowed to build and occupy huts or cabins on the periphery. This was especially likely if the men were married, but unmarried soldiers might likewise be granted the privilege. The pattern of existence that was typical of the army not only permitted, but encouraged, alcohol abuse. Life in billet, garrison, and fort was dull, often aimless. Bell, who had served in the West Indies, later wrote that soldiers there were bored: "Occasionally mounting guard, attending parade morning and evening, with the injurious and often unnecessary fatigue of a field-day, constitute the whole duty of a soldier in a West India island, even in time of war." He claimed that this tedious existence greatly contributed to alcohol abuse in the islands, going so far as to advise that raw recruits not be sent there, because they lacked the discipline of veterans and were therefore more likely to become depressed by the tedium and turn to drink.21
Concerns over drunkenness in the ranks were common to chaplains, medical personnel, officers, and some soldiers. Clergymen, not surprisingly, cast their position in moral terms, and appeals for temperance were often accompanied by threats that damnation awaited the drinker.22 The Soldier's Monitor, a tract written by Josiah Woodward in 1701 and published in many editions through to the 1830s, appealed not only to the soldiers' fears, but also to their sense of pride. Some soldiers accepted the moralists' message, or in any case practiced temperance. Those who did could play a significant role in shaping the drinking habits of their comrades. According to Bell, "In Britain a soldier has an ample allowance of malt liquor, which, in general, being the drink of those with whom he associates, he consequently has fewer inducements to the use of spirits, and therefore seldom acquires an habit of drinking them to excess."25 Medical opinion also stood against alcohol abuse. Often the complaints of physicians, no less than those of the clergy, were couched in moralistic terms. As Stephen Hales, a clergyman with an interest in medical subjects, claimed, historically the opposition to alcohol abuse had been led by "the physician and the moralist."26 On the whole, however, physicians who wrote on drunkenness focused on the physical, rather than the moral, damage that could be caused by drink. Some noted that liquor itself could be fatal. There was also the issue of cost. Rum alone cost the army in America seven to eleven shillings per month per man-depending on market prices, the quality of the liquor, and the size of the ration-and even the lower figure was more than the typical soldier received monthly, after stoppages.38 Officers often expressed concern over the expense involved in obtaining alcoholic beverages for their men, and proposed cost-cutting measures.39 The cost factor also limited the willingness to introduce new Commanding officers were in a position to initiate policies that combatted drunkenness, and many of them did so. Their campaign was run on several levels. A common aim was to prevent unsanctioned liquor from reaching the troops. The number of sutlers was sometimes reduced, or sutlers were barred from selling spirits. Soldiers' wives and noncommissioned officers who were selling liquor to the men might likewise be forbidden to continue. And soldiers might themselves be prohibited from leaving camp without official authorization. Sometimes the campaigns centered on efforts to prevent sentries from drinking while on duty.41 To encourage healing and also to maintain discipline, special efforts were aimed at preventing sick soldiers from obtaining liquor in hospital, and numerous orders were directed toward keeping alcohol out of the hands of prisoners in the provost. Drunkenness was itself regarded as an offense, even when it was not accompanied by misbehavior. Consequently, numerous orders set out punishments, often extra duty or drill, for soldiers who were found to be drunk, particularly at roll-call and church parade.52 Compounding the offense of drunkenness was the misbehavior and crime associated with it. Officers took pains to point out to their men the linkage between excessive drinking and the punishments that were regularly meted out to them. On 13 July 1776, soldiers of the 12th Foot, stationed in Gibraltar, were admonished, "few Men are brought to the Halberts, that Drunkenness has not been the Occasion. If the Men will but be Sober, few of them will be punished." On 30 July they were told, "there are now 18 prisoners in the Regiment, and all of them but one for being Drunk."53 The disciplinary problem may have been greatest in America, for according to an anonymous observer, "of all the Regiments gone to America before they were Six Months in the country they have had more flogging among them for drunkenness alone, than they would have had in Europe Drunkenness is a Vice of all others, the most brutal in its Nature, the most Ruinous in its Consequences, and unfits a man for every station and duty, it is the source of every irregularity, from it Proceeds idleness, slovenliness, neglect of orders, and a total loss of all Military appearance, and character. it breeds disobedience, creates Mutiny, It is apparent that many officers were deeply concerned by the extent of drunkenness in the army. Nevertheless, beyond attempting to limit the supply of liquor and punishing drunken behavior, few officers did much to ameliorate the problem of alcohol abuse. In an attempt to reduce the impact of the liquor ration, soldiers, like their counterparts in the navy, were often given their rum watered or were ordered to dilute it. However, the advantage gained was probably small. Bell argued that watering was actually detrimental, for grog was habit-forming.56 And watering represented the officers' only concerted attempt to reduce the potency of the liquor that their men consumed.
Intemperance
As the preceding discussion suggests, elements within most key groups in the army did attempt to limit alcohol abuse. There is evidence that soldiers' drinking habits were influenced by those of their comrades, some of whom were abstemious, at least as regarded hard liquor. Regimental clergy and evangelizing groups, using both the spoken and the printed word, denounced drunkenness. So did leading medical figures. Perhaps most important, many commanding officers mounted cam- 
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* THE JOURNAL OF paigns aimed at discouraging intoxication among the troops. Each potential source of change, however, was seriously flawed, and this undermined attempts to combat the problem. Any campaign to reduce drunkenness had to overcome two significant obstacles: one, the alcoholic culture that surrounded and shaped the military, and two, the widespread belief that liquor was in some respects useful to the army.
That alcohol abuse was rampant in eighteenth-century England is generally accepted. Indeed, the evidence appears to be overwhelming. There is the testimony of contemporary observers like Samuel Johnson, who once recalled that when he was a boy, "all the decent people in Lichfield got drunk every night, and were not the worse thought of"; or Henry Fielding, who in 1751 asserted that gin was "the principal Sustenance" of more than 100,000 Londoners. Available data suggests that toward mid-century the annual per capita consumption of spirits in London exceeded seven gallons.57 Moreover, it was commonly the case that drinkers aimed not to drink so much as to get drunk. tion, but as a condition over which individuals had control, if they chose to exert it. Writers argued that even a confirmed drunkard could quite easily curtail his drinking, or even quit entirely. Among them was Hales, who reported that "a very eminent Physician" had cured several individuals of habitual drunkenness by watering their liquor in progressively higher degrees, until after one week they were drinking water only.611 Since drinking habits were held to be a matter of choice, drunkards were seen as depraved or weak, people who chose not to reform. The army's tendency to simply punish drunkenness, and the misbehavior that grew from it, accorded well with the conceptual norm of the period, one that placed the onus for reform on the drinker himself. Likewise relevant to the army example was another common eighteenth-century attitude. While society might condemn the habitual drunkard, it often lionized the heavy drinker who seemed able to function well. Even drunkenness was deemed acceptable if it did not result in a form of behavior that was disgraceful or degenerate. The ability of a drinker to handle liquor was intimately linked to contemporary concepts of manliness. It was in this context that Johnson made his famous comment, "claret is the liquor for boys; port for men; but he who aspires to be a hero . . . must drink brandy."'61
From this alcoholic culture, the British Army drew its personnel, and indeed soldiers were often recruited in taverns. Wellington observed, "the English soldiers are fellows who have all enlisted for drink," and although his assertion may be somewhat overbroad, it is probable that a high proportion of those who joined the army came in already established as heavy drinkers.62 Thus, alcohol abuse was the rule, sobriety the exception, and generally non-drinkers were looked on with puzzlement, even contempt. Knox noted the case of two soldiers who "were both remarkably sober men, and had frequently been rallied by their comrades for their abstemiousness."63 It was not merely that abstemious soldiers were a rarity, but that their habits seemed to be at odds with accepted criteria of manliness. that "sobriety itself might be an error," although he added, "to this error few officers are likely to fall a sacrifice." And while medical writers late in the century tended to be more negative in their attitude toward liquor, they also challenged some assertions regarding its supposed dangers, notably, that it caused fever (a legend to which Albemarle, among other officers, subscribed).7
Denunciations of drinking from the pulpit and in religious tracts
The inconsistencies within the medical community at large were epitomized in Bell. On the whole, he was a hard-liner in his attitude toward the use of liquor in the military. He condemned the widespread medicinal use of wine, claiming, "there is no remedy in the materia medica prescribed so frequently as wine, with so little attention to the circumstances which ought to direct or forbid its use, or to regulate the quantity in which it is employed."75 He also noted that remedies containing liquor might themselves encourage drunkenness: "The use of fruit preserved in brandy, or the use of various bitters infused in it, which has been prescribed as a remedy, has led many persons of both sexes, and of every rank of life, into an habit of drinking to excess. They, like many soldiers, feel a craving and uneasy sensation in the stomach, to alleviate which, they have recourse to the cause which originally produced it." Despite these complaints, Bell did not object to liquor per se, but only to habitual drunkenness. Nor did he criticize the army's role in distributing alcoholic beverages in general, just hard liquor, and even here he was flexible, for he recommended that spirits be given to troops who were cold or fatigued. Brewed or fermented beverages generally won his approval. He wanted wine to be given to troops regularly, to preserve health, and he described malt liquor as "an invigorating, antiseptic, salutary beverage ... highly nutritive."76 That medical opinion on alcohol was divided allowed army men of all ranks to believe what they preferred, and for most of them this was that alcoholic beverages, at least some of them, were safe, even beneficial. Predilection usually spoke against abstemiousness, and a legend that favored spirits could counterbalance much evidence that they were dangerous. Hales observed, Were the officers perhaps inhibited in attacking drunkenness by their own penchant for alcohol? On the contrary, as General Robert Wilson recalled of the Napoleonic Wars, "What shocked me most was to see courts-martial adjudging men to be punished for an offence of which the members themselves had often been guilty at the same time, and from which they had frequently not recovered when passing sentence."80 The officers had several reasons for avoiding an all-out effort to reduce drinking in the ranks. An appearance of hypocrisy was probably not among them.
On the other hand, the officers' drinking habits suggest that as a group they found nothing wrong with alcohol. In weighing evidence about the impact of liquor on the army, therefore, a high proportion of them were predisposed to finding benefits. And certainly there were arguments made for liquor. If the medical community, both inside and outside the army, had been consistent in condemning the policy of distributing liquor freely to the troops, those in command might well have taken steps to alter that policy, for on matters relating to health they tended to heed the advice of medical officers, especially hospital physicians and surgeons.83 As the attitude of medical men was quite inconsistent, officers were left room to follow their own predilections. They were free to believe that liquor was, as various sources suggested, a good water purifier, an invaluable tonic, especially in cold or inclement weather, and a potent medicine, either preventive or curative.
Officers who failed to take strong action to curb drinking within the army may in some cases have been concerned that widespread trouble or even mutiny might result if the liquor ration were cut off. In 1791, Robert Jackson, the noted army surgeon, claimed, In the management of liquor, the Victorian army had several decisive advantages over its eighteenth-century counterpart. First, the ability of officers to keep watch over their men increased. The widespread use of barracks, instead of relying on billeting, made it possible to monitor the liquor consumption of the troops, at least so long as they remained in their compound. In this connection, the order, in 1848, to bar the sale of spirits in army canteens may well have had a significant impact. Still, in garrison towns there were the pubs that catered to servicemen.91 Success in efforts to significantly reduce drinking therefore depended also on reducing the desire of the men for drink, and here again Victorian officers who wished to promote abstemiousness had a great advantage, since the temperance movement, which peaked during the latter half of the nineteenth century, devoted significant attention to combatting drunkenness in the army. The Victorians injected a strongly religious flavor into their appeals for temperance, and undoubtedly many soldiers and officers were repelled by the tone, but others were attracted and took the pledge of abstinence, while temperance societies and clubs provided reinforcement for troops who were attempting to reform. Highly placed army medical personnel strongly promoted the drive to curb drinking, and many officers both demanded and practiced abstemiousness.92
Eighteenth-century officers, not having at their disposal sufficient housing for their men, could not have monitored the drinking habits of the troops. Nor did they have the general support of society to mount a concerted effort to curb alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, they could have done more.
Of the campaigns that were launched, it may be said, first, that they were unimaginative. Little effort was made to promote alternatives to the liquor that the men consumed in such quantities. Some medical authorities proposed programs for reducing alcohol consumption by substituting less potent beverages for spirits. Bell claimed that by providing porter and ale officers could break soldiers of the habit of drinking spirits, and he believed that troops could be entirely weaned from alcohol if their commanders replaced the liquor ration with cocoa or fruit juice.93 But it appears that few if any officers heeded his advice. It may be, therefore, that the failure of efforts to reduce drunkenness can in part be laid to a lack of creativity. But it is not the greater part.
Eighteenth-century campaigns were generally focused on the consumer, the soldier, rather than on a reduction of supply. Officers could have been more consistent in attacking the source of supply. Sutlers, a major supplier of liquor, were vulnerable to such pressure, for if they were deprived of their licenses for selling spirits they of course lost their entire business. Certainly, the army could likewise have reduced its own role in supply, by reducing or eliminating the liquor ration.
Instead of pursuing policies that might have reduced alcohol abuse, commanding officers introduced half-hearted campaigns, directed mainly at the bad behavior associated with drunkenness. This half-heartedness reflected ambivalence and uncertainty. Although most officers believed that habitual drunkenness represented a threat to health, medical opinion was sufficiently divided as to allow them to follow their predilections when it came to deciding just how great the danger was, and it encouraged them to believe that at least some alcoholic beverages were actually beneficial. And while drunkenness clearly undermined discipline, here again there was no clear course to follow, for continuing the supply, with the army itself as a major supplier, provided officers with significant leverage over the troops. Undoubtedly, the officers would have preferred to be in a position to better manage the drinking habits of their men, but they could see disadvantages to dramatically reducing the soldiers' desire for alcohol. So it was that those in command concentrated on combatting the behavior that was the effect of alcohol abuse, rather than on initiating an all-out effort to end that abuse.
